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Abstract 
We explore the effects of NTMs on extensive and intensive margins of export, focus-
ing on seafood trade at various levels of aggregation. While SPS measures largely 
influence the variable trade costs, increasing extensive margins of export and re-
ducing intensive margins, TBTs mostly increase fixed trade costs, reducing exten-
sive margins of export and increasing intensive margins. STCs have larger effect on 
exports than SPS and TBT notifications both economically and statistically – STCs 
are mostly raised by exporters when their trade is considerably affected by regula-
tions. Finally, there is substantial heterogeneity of response of exports to NTBs 
across product lines for more disaggregated data. 
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 Introduction 
Non-tariff measures (NTM) have always been important elements of trade policy. 
With global reduction in traditional import tariffs, they are becoming relatively 
more important and frequent policy tools shaping the World trade. Number of tariff 
lines and share of trade covered by NTMs have increased between 1996 and 2004 
(World Trade Report, 2012). NTMs come in different forms and address different 
policy concerns. While the consensus view on the tariff measures is in favor of re-
duction as the way to increase global social welfare, the view on NTMs is more nu-
anced. Increased public concerns about health and safety issues stimulate govern-
ments to regulate quality and safety of goods by means of sanitary and phytosani-
tary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT). As the World Trade Re-
port (2012) points out, there is an upward trend in both SPS and TBT notifications. 
In particular, 2010 has shown both the maximum number of SPS and TBT notifica-
tions.  
The effect of NTMs on trade is not straightforward. On the one hand, it may im-
pose additional costs on exporters. Here, it is important to distinguish the effect of 
NTMs on fixed costs of producing, from the effect on fixed costs of exporting, from 
the effect on variable trade costs. In the framework of the Melitz (2003) model, a 
non-discriminatory increase in the fixed cost of production would cut the least pro-
ductive domestic firms from the market, which, among other things, would en-
courage entrance of new importers. Tougher technological or sanitary measures 
would tend to increase a threshold for the least productive domestic firms on the 
market, which would make more room for importing firms, resulting in a positive 
link between technical and sanitary requirements in foreign country and extensive 
margin of trade for exporters. The increase in fixed exporting costs would lead to 
the exit of the least productive exporters from the market, reducing extensive mar-
gins of trade. The increase in the variable trade costs would lead to reduction in 
export per firm, but also would cause the least productive exporters exit from the 
foreign market, redistributing exports towards more productive firms. The overall 
effect on export is ambiguous.   On the other hand, higher technical and safety bar-
riers may increase demand from the consumers who are concerned about quality 
and safety attributes of products. Firms that are able to overcome higher trade bar-
riers would signal about quality and safety improvements, which would lead to 
expansion of trade at both extensive and intensive margins. Therefore, it is hard to 
say a priori whether NTMs have a positive or negative effects on exports and its 
extensive and intensive margins. 
In this work we deal with this question empirically and explore the effect of 
NTBs on export, carefully modelling export decisions at extensive and intensive 
margins. We mostly build on work by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), 
adding the panel dimension to their approach. We also address the issue of en-
dogeneity of trade policy using the Hausman-Taylor approach of estimating the 
panel data model (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). We treat NTBs as endogenous vari-
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ables that to a large extent depend on existing trade patterns. In particular, NTBs 
are more likely between countries that trade more intensively, that would generate 
a positive correlation between trade flows and NTMs. 
We focus on exports of seafood – a category of products, where SPS and TBT are 
used frequently. We analyze the effect of NTMs on extensive and intensive margins 
of trade at various levels of aggregation. First, the main result of this study is differ-
ential effect of SPS and TBT measures. SPS measures largely increase extensive 
margins of export and reduce intensive margins, which is consistent with the in-
creasing production fixed costs story. TBTs mostly increase fixed costs of exporting, 
reducing extensive margins of export and increasing intensive margins. Second, 
specific trade concerns (STC) have larger effect on exports than SPS and TBT notifi-
cations both economically and statistically – which is not surprising since STCs are 
mostly raised by exporters when their trade is considerably affected by regulations. 
Finally, there is substantial heterogeneity of response of exports to NTBs across 
product lines for higher disaggregated data. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses literature on 
NTBs, focusing on seafood trade. Section 3 introduces data used in the study. Sec-
tion 4 develops the methodology. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 Literature 
Literature on the effects of NTMs on export is not conclusive. Jaffee and Henson 
(2004) argue that NTMs can be barriers as well as catalysts to exports. For poor 
countries with lack of capacity to comply with the stringent regulations the NTM 
can increase trade costs to the levels that effectively shut down their exports. How-
ever, other countries may use this to their advantage and capture larger market 
share due to increased demand for safer and better quality products.  
The empirical results are mixed. Most studies have found a negative effect of 
NTMs on trade. (i.e. Fontagne et al., 2005; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001; 
Peterson and Orden, 2005). Debaere (2010) has shown that the international dif-
ferences in food-safety standards reduced Thai, Vietnamese, and Chinese shrimp 
exports to Europe and shifted them to the United States where standards were not 
as strict as in EU. However, more recent studies have found that NTMs can serve as 
catalysts of trade as well.  Anders and Caswell (2009) investigated the effect of a 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) food safety standard for seafood 
imports. Results indicate that HACCP had a negative impact on the overall imports. 
However, a decomposition of the effect by exporting countries’ level of develop-
ment brought highly heterogeneous results. The effect for developing countries was 
negative, while the effect for developed countries was positive. Moreover, regard-
less of the level of development, leading seafood exporters generally experienced a 
positive HACCP effect. The results can be explained within a framework of the het-
erogeneous producer model. The HACCP has imposed additional costs on all im-
porters, but it perhaps made a cost prohibitively high for the least productive im-
porters, while allowing more productive importers to take the opportunity and ex-
pand their market share. 
Our empirical approach is close to Crivelly and Groschl (2012) who have inves-
tigated the effect of the SPS measures on trade in agriculture and food using the 
methodology developed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubistein (2008). They found that 
conformity assessment related SPS measures have a negative impact on intensive 
margins of exports, while concerns related to product characteristics influence in-
tensive margins of exports positively. The effect of SPS on the intensive margin of 
exports in their work is negative. 
Our focus, however, is on seafood trade and on the effect of both SPS and TBT 
measures. As become clear from the result, the high degree of heterogeneity of the 
impact of NTBs on trade and differential effects of SPS and TBT measures requires 
studying the effect of NTMs at high level of disaggregation. We also introduce a 
time dimension to the analysis, while the HMR method was developed for a cross-
section of bilateral trade2.  
                                                          
2  See Shepotylo (2010) for more detailed discussion of the econometrics methodology. 
 Data 
Export data 
We define seafood products as all HS section 03 (Fish and crustaceans, mollusks 
and other aquatic invertebrates) product lines and HS four-digit 1603 (Extracts and 
juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks), 1604 (Prepared or preserved fish; 
caviar and caviar substitutes), and 1605 (Crustaceans, mollusks, prepared or pre-
served) product lines. Exports from country i to country j of a seafood product k at 
time t, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡, measured in thousands of current US dollars are taken from the 
COMTRADE database. We limit the time span to 1996-2010. Trade data in 
COMTRADE is missing for a large group of countries prior to 1996, which would 
introduce a highly-nonlinear measurement error in our estimation procedure, 
which would not be able to discriminate missing observations from zero exports. 
World export of seafood in 1996-2011 has been growing rapidly, averaging 9 
percent per year. Figure 1 reports value of seafood trade for high income countries 
and low and middle income countries in 1996-2011. The seafood export form high 
income countries has been growing 5.8 percent on average, while the seafood ex-
port from the low and middle income countries has been growing 13.9 percent on 
average. Exports form the least developed countries has been even larger 26 per-
cent. That allowed the export from the group of low and middle income countries to 
overcome the export from the group of high income countries in 2009.           
Figure 1 Export of seafood in 1996-2011: High income vs. low and middle income countries 
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Table 1 lists all six-digit product lines, analyzed in this study, giving a brief de-
scription of each product category and value of cumulative export in 1996-2010. 
Over the investigated period, total export of seafood products has been equal to 0.9 
trillion US dollars. The most exported products of seafood trade were product lines 
030613 (frozen shrimps and prawns, 113.0 billion US dollars), 030420 (frozen 
fillets, 94.3 billion US dollars), and 030212 (fresh or chilled: Pacific salmon, Atlan-
tic salmon, and Danube salmon, 45.6 billion US dollars).  
NTB measures 
NTB measures for this study come from the WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Por-
tal (I-TIP). It includes members’ notifications as well as specific trade concerns 
about SPS measures.3 Notifications are self-reported changes into the legislation 
affecting trade. Under the GATT rules countries are obliged to report the other WTO 
members about these changes. However, there is an issue with countries’ compli-
ance to report these measures, as has been discussed for instance at the Uruguay 
Round of the multilateral trade negotiations with the Decision on Notification Pro-
cedures signed by the WTO members. Reporting countries have no incentives to 
provide most accurate and up-to-date information on non-tariff measures and 
compliance systematically vary across countries. Countries that are affected by 
such decisions, on the other hand, have incentives to file a complaint. These com-
plaints are recorded as STCs in the I-TIP. However, these concerns do not cover the 
whole universe of SPS and TBT measures. STCs are the NTB measures with the larg-
est negative impact that introduces a negative selection bias into the estimation of 
the effect of NTBs on trade. 
We use both notifications and STCs when estimating the effect of NTBs on sea-
food exports. The initial data includes 335 SPS and 78 TBT measures for seafood 
products notified to the WTO and 40 STCs raised by the WTO members from 1996 
till 2010. Based on the information about the initiating and affected countries and 
about the products affected, we constructed SPS, TBT, and STC binary variables 
that take the value of 1 if an importing country j has a corresponding measure for 
product line k (HS six-digit level) against an exporting country i at time t and takes 
the value of 0 otherwise. When constructing the data, we included all possible 
combinations of bilateral trade flows, regardless of the fact whether the positive 
export took place. 
After the NTBs were constructed at the HS six-digit level, we aggregated them to 
the HS 4-digit level according to the following rule 
𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑗ℎ,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑘,𝑡𝑘∈𝐽ℎ
𝐽ℎ
∗ , 
where h is HS four-digit product code, k is HS six-digit product code,  𝐽ℎ is a set that 
includes all six-digit product  lines that belong to h,  𝐽ℎ
∗   is the number of six-digit 
product lines in 𝐽ℎ, and 𝑁𝑇𝐵 = {𝑆𝑃𝑆, 𝑇𝐵𝑇, 𝑆𝑇𝐶}. 
                                                          
3  I-TIP reports STCs about both SPS and TBT measures. However, there were no TBT STCs for sea-
food products during the investigated period. 
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Table 1 presents summary statistics for all measures of NTB in columns 4-6. SPS 
measures are the most widespread, affecting 15.4 percent of all possible bilateral 
exports. Live and fresh fish product categories are affected by SPS measures more 
frequently than frozen, semi-processed (salted, dried, or smoked), and cooked sea-
food products. TBT measures, on the other hand, affect 3.1 percent of bilateral ex-
ports and are more widespread for cooked and processed seafood products. STCs 
are the least frequent, affecting only 0.2 percent of bilateral exports. It is partially 
due to the fact that SPS and TBT notification are recorded in I-TIP as affecting all 
trading partners (meaning that if EU introduces an SPS measure it affects all of its 
trading partners in a non-discriminatory manner), while STC are raised by a specif-
ic exporting country against a specific importing country. It does not mean that an 
STC measure has no effect on other countries, but we do not have information on 
other potentially affected countries.  
Table 1 Summary statistics of seafood exports and non-tariff barriers in 1996-2010 
HS 
code 
(HS 
1996) 
Description 
Export in 
1996-2010, 
billion USD 
Share of lines with 
SPS TBT STC 
0301 Live fish: 14.6 0.165 0.019 0.0027 
030110 Ornamental fish 3.3 0.162 0.019 0.0027 
030191 Trout 0.9 0.161 0.019 0.0027 
030192 Eels 3.3 0.161 0.019 0.0027 
030193 Carp 0.5 0.161 0.019 0.0027 
030199 Other 6.6 0.161 0.019 0.0027 
0302 Fish, fresh or chilled: 112.0 0.193 0.019 0.0029 
030211 Trout 2.2 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030212 Pacific salmon, Atlantic salmon, and Danube salm-
on 
45.6 0.192 0.019 0.0027 
030219 Salmonaide: Other 1.8 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030221 Halibut 1.9 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030222 Plaice 1.1 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030223 Sole 3.2 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030229 Other 3.1 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030231 Albacore or longfinned tunas 0.7 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030232 Yellowfin tunas 1.9 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030233 Skipjack or stripe-bellied bonito 0.1 0.191 0.022 0.0027 
030239 Tunas:-- Other 6.7 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030240 Herrings 1.4 0.192 0.019 0.0027 
030250 Cod 4.7 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030261 Sardines, sardinella, brisling or sprats 1.0 0.191 0.022 0.0027 
030262 Haddock 1.6 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030263 Coalfish 0.8 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030264 Mackerel 1.2 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030265 Dogfish and other sharks 0.5 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030266 Eels 0.3 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
030269 Other fish:-- Other 31.7 0.193 0.019 0.0027 
030270 Livers and roes 0.6 0.191 0.019 0.0027 
0303 Fish, frozen: 136.0 0.143 0.028 0.0028 
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HS 
code 
(HS 
1996) 
Description 
Export in 
1996-2010, 
billion USD 
Share of lines with 
SPS TBT STC 
030310 Pacific salmon 11.8 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030321 Trout 5.4 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030322 Atlantic salmon and Danube salmon 4.0 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030329 Other salmonidae:-- Other 2.4 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030331 Halibut 3.8 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030332 Plaice 0.6 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030333 Sole 1.5 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030339 Flat fish:-- Other 2.6 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030341 Albacore or longfinned tunas 1.7 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030342 Yellowfin tunas 5.6 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030343 Skipjack or strip-bellied bonito 3.7 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030349 Tunas:-- Other 5.9 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030350 Herrings 6.9 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030360 Cod 5.9 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030371 Sardines, sardinella, brisling or sprats 2.9 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030372 Haddock 1.0 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030373 Coalfish 0.7 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030374 Mackerel 12.1 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030375 Dogfish and other sharks 1.4 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030376 Eels 0.4 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030377 Sea bass 0.2 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030378 Hake 5.8 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
030379 Other fish:-- Other 41.6 0.146 0.028 0.0026 
030380 Livers and roes 8.5 0.143 0.028 0.0026 
0304 Fish fillets and other fish meat: 147.0 0.147 0.018 0.0030 
030410 Fresh or chilled 32.2 0.147 0.016 0.0026 
030420 Frozen fillets 94.3 0.148 0.022 0.0026 
030490 Other 20.3 0.147 0.016 0.0026 
0305 Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish: 46.9 0.142 0.022 0.0029 
030510 Flours, meals and pellets of fish 0.5 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030520 Livers and roes, dried, smoked, salted or in brine 2.8 0.146 0.022 0.0026 
030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted or in brine, but not 
smoked 
5.2 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030541 Smoked fish:-- Pacific salmon, Atlantic salmon 8.0 0.142 0.022 0.0026 
030542 Smoked fish:-- Herrings 0.4 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030549 Smoked fish:-- Other 3.4 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030551 Dried fish:-- Cod 8.8 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030559 Dried fish:-- Other 7.3 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030561 Fish, salted:-- Herrings 0.6 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030562 Fish, salted:-- Cod 7.0 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030563 Fish, salted:-- Anchovies 0.8 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
030569 Fish, salted:-- Other 2.0 0.141 0.022 0.0026 
0306 Crustaceans: 172.0 0.159 0.024 0.0024 
030611 Frozen :-- Rock lobster and other sea crawfish 7.0 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030612 Frozen :-- Lobsters 4.9 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
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HS 
code 
(HS 
1996) 
Description 
Export in 
1996-2010, 
billion USD 
Share of lines with 
SPS TBT STC 
030613 Frozen :-- Shrimps and prawns 113.0 0.163 0.024 0.0027 
030614 Frozen :-- Crabs 13.4 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030619 Frozen :-- Other 5.5 0.159 0.024 0.0020 
030621 Not frozen :-- Rock lobster and other sea crawfish 4.8 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030622 Not frozen :-- Lobsters 10.0 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030623 Not frozen :-- Shrimps and prawns 6.4 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030624 Not frozen :-- Crabs 4.1 0.158 0.024 0.0020 
030629 Not frozen :-- Other 3.1 0.159 0.024 0.0020 
0307 Mollusks and aquatic invertebrates: 73.3 0.186 0.020 0.0026 
030710 Oysters 2.4 0.187 0.019 0.0022 
030721 Scallops:-- Live, fresh or chilled 2.6 0.185 0.019 0.0022 
030729 Scallops:-- Other 7.4 0.185 0.019 0.0022 
030731 Mussels:-- Live, fresh or chilled 3.1 0.185 0.019 0.0022 
030739 Mussels:-- Other 2.3 0.185 0.020 0.0022 
030741 Cuttle fish and squid:-- Live, fresh or chilled 3.3 0.183 0.019 0.0022 
030749 Cuttle fish and squid:-- Other 21.5 0.184 0.019 0.0022 
030751 Octopus:-- Live, fresh or chilled 1.1 0.183 0.019 0.0022 
030759 Octopus:-- Other 9.6 0.183 0.019 0.0022 
030760 Snails, other than sea snails 0.8 0.186 0.019 0.0022 
030791 Other:-- Live, fresh or chilled 8.4 0.185 0.019 0.0022 
030799 Other:-- Other 10.5 0.185 0.019 0.0022 
160300 Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, 
mollusks 
1.7 0.108 0.076 0.0007 
1604 Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar sub-
stitutes: 
110.0 0.106 0.083 0.0009 
160411 Salmon 5.5 0.104 0.082 0.0008 
160412 Herrings 5.0 0.104 0.082 0.0008 
160413 Sardines, sardinella and brisling or sprats 8.9 0.109 0.085 0.0008 
160414 Tunas, skipjack and bonito 34.6 0.108 0.084 0.0008 
160415 Mackerel 3.5 0.105 0.082 0.0008 
160416 Anchovies 1.7 0.104 0.082 0.0008 
160419 Other 26.3 0.104 0.082 0.0008 
160420 Other prepared or preserved fish 20.3 0.111 0.084 0.0008 
160430 Caviar and caviar substitutes 4.3 0.104 0.082 0.0008 
1605 Crustaceans, mollusks, prepared or preserved: 73.6 0.100 0.073 0.0007 
160510 Crab 6.8 0.093 0.072 0.0006 
160520 Shrimps and prawns 39.1 0.093 0.072 0.0006 
160530 Lobster 2.0 0.093 0.072 0.0006 
160540 Other crustaceans 3.2 0.093 0.072 0.0006 
160590 Other 22.5 0.123 0.073 0.0006 
All Total Export and average NTB in 1996-2010 887.1 0.154 0.031 0.002 
Notes: Export statistics is from the COMTRADE database. The share of lines with SPS, TBT, and STC (both SPS and 
NTB) measures is computed as the ratio of the number of bilateral export lines with a non-tariff measure within HS 
four-digit (HS six-digit) product category to the total number of theoretically possible bilateral lines within the 
corresponding product HS category.    
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Gravity model variables 
The data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita in current US are 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2012 published by the World Bank. 
Geographical characteristics and distance between countries are taken from the 
Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII, see Head, 
Mayer, and Ries, 2010 for detailed description of the data). Colony and contiguity 
dummy variables (whether one of the countries in the country-pair was ever a colo-
ny of the other country and whether countries share a common border) are used to 
control for pair-specific trade costs that are not directly related to distance. The 
same language dummy variable captures the effect of cultural similarities on trade. 
The dummy on common legal origin captures the compatibility of the legal systems 
of trading partners. Finally, the data on different dimensions of trading across bor-
ders, which are used for assessment of the impact of trade facilitation on exports – 
cost of shipping a container from exporting country, cost of shipping a container to 
importing country, and number of documents required to export and import – are 
computed as the period average, using the Doing Business database produced by 
the World Bank. The methodology of computing the trade facilitation variables is 
described in Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010). 
Selection Variables 
For identification of the first stage parameters, we chose three variables that enter 
the selection equation, but not the gravity equation. The common religion dummy 
controls for the pair-specific fixed costs related to adapting to cultural and linguis-
tic barriers between two countries (culture, tastes, translation costs, advertising). 
The number of documents required to export from country i and the number of 
documents required to import to country j, collected by the Doing Business surveys 
since 2004, control for country-specific fixed costs related to regulatory quality in 
exporting and importing countries. Finally, we include log GDP per capita in the 
exporting country as a proxy for the factor unit cost parameter. All these variables 
are more likely related to a binary choice decision – to export or not – rather than 
influence intensive margins of trade. 
 Methodology 
We take into account the mechanism of selection of firms into exporters and unob-
served firm-level heterogeneity, present in the data, by applying the methodology 
developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (HMR, 2008). The presence of fixed 
costs that sometimes introduce prohibitively high trade barriers explains zero trade 
flows that play a dominating role in highly disaggregated data. The HMR two-stage 
procedure allows to dissect the effect of NTMs on export into two components – the 
effect of NTMs on value of trade between two countries (intensive margins) and the 
effect of NTMs on the probability of positive export (extensive margins). The latter 
is important because, as shown in the Melitz (2003) model, imposing a new trade 
barrier causes the changes in probability of trade. 
The HMR estimation procedure is modified to take introduce the time dimension 
into the data and control for endogeneity of policy variables by the Hasuman-
Taylor method (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). It allows for the decision of imposing 
an NTM to be endogenous, and it is instrumented by the time-invariant bilateral 
characteristics (i.e. geographical distance, contiguity, common legal system etc.), 
deviation of exogenous variables from their means, as well as period-average vari-
able characteristics (level of economic development, market size). 
We briefly outline the estimation procedure. Consider a monopolistic competi-
tion model with consumer preferences identical and homothetic across countries. 
Each country 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐶 has 𝑁𝑘
𝑖  firms that produce differentiated products in indus-
tries 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾. Let 𝑐𝑘𝑙
𝑖𝑗
 denote total consumption in country j of a good l that is 
produced by sector k in country i. 
Consumers 
A representative consumer located in country j has the utility function of the fol-
lowing form: 
 
 










K
k Bl
j
kl
j
k
j
k
dlcU
1



, 
where 𝜎 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across different products. 𝜃𝑘 is the ex-
penditure share of industry k in total consumption. 𝐵𝑘
𝑗
 is the set of industry k goods 
that are available for consumption in country j. 
The optimal consumption derived from the optimization problem is 
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𝑐𝑘𝑙
𝑗 =
𝜃𝑘𝑌
𝑗
𝑃𝑘
𝑗 (
𝑝𝑘𝑙
𝑗
𝑃𝑘
𝑗)
−𝜎
, 
where 
jY  is the gross domestic product of country j that is equal to the total ex-
penditures of country j. 
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k dlpP is the price index. 
Producers 
A country i firm produces one unit of output with 𝑤𝑖𝑎 units of labor.4 𝑤𝑖 is country 
specific. 𝑎 is a firm-specific parameter with the cumulative distribution function 
𝐺𝑘(𝑎) over support [𝑎𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥]. Each firm is a monopolist over the production of 
a distinct good but is small relative to the size of the market. A standard formula for 
monopolistic pricing implies that the firm charges the mill price as a constant 
markup over the marginal cost 
𝑝𝑖 =
𝜎
𝜎 − 1
𝑤𝑖𝑎 
There are variable and fixed costs of delivering products to consumer markets that 
vary across industries. 𝑇𝑘
𝑖𝑗
 is a melting iceberg transportation cost with 𝑇𝑘
𝑖𝑗 >
1, 𝑇𝑘
𝑖𝑖 = 1. 𝐹𝑘
𝑖𝑗
 is a fixed cost of exporting that is country-pair and industry specific 
with 𝐹𝑘
𝑖𝑗 > 0, 𝐹𝑘
𝑖𝑖 = 0. If the firm chooses to export its product to country j, consum-
ers in country j pay 𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑗 = 𝑇𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖. It follows that the profit of the firm exporting to 
country j is 
1
( ) .
( 1)
ij i
ij j ijk k
k kj
k
T w a
a Y F
P

 

 

 
  
   
The firm exports only if it receives positive operating profits, which is more likely if 
the productivity of the firm (
1
𝑎
) is high, the input price (𝑤𝑖) is low, and the fixed 
costs of exporting (𝐹𝑘
𝑖𝑗
) are low. The least productive firm that exports to country j 
has the productivity level 1/𝑎𝑘
𝑖𝑗
 determined as 
1
( ) 0 .
( 1)
ij i ij
ij ij j ijk k k
k k kj
k
T w a
a Y F
P

 

 

 
   
   
Parameterization and estimation strategy 
                                                          
4  We consider a partial equilibrium model with fixed capital during the period being investigated. 
Labor is the only input that is perfectly mobile across industries but immobile across countries. 
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Out of 𝑁𝑘
𝑖  firms that operate in country i in industry k, only )( ijkk
i
k aGN  firms export to 
country j. The aggregate export in industry k from exporter i to country j is 
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min
)(1  . 
The equation can be further simplified by using the equilibrium constraints on the 
output of sector k produced by country i that leads to the following export equation 
  
1
1
1
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,  (1) 
given the condition 
1
( ) 0 .
( 1)
ij i ij
ij ij j ijk k k
k k kj
k
T w a
a Y F
P

 

 

 
   
   (2) 
Selection of firms 
In the following discussion, the industry index k is dropped for the reader’s con-
venience. A distribution of productivities or the productivity of the marginal ex-
porter 
ij
ta  is not observable. However, we observe positive and zero trade flows. We 
define a latent variable 
ij
t , the ratio of the variable profits to the fixed cost of for 
the most productive firm, as 
ij
t
j
tj
t
i
t
ij
ij
t
F
Y
P
awT














1
min
)1(
. (3) 
A positive export is observed if 1 ijt .  
Trade costs associated with the shipping of a unit of good from country i to 
country j are modelled as 
)exp()()( 1 ijt
ij
t
ijij
t uRdistT 
  , 
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where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗  is the distance between countries i and j and R is a set of additional 
variables that determine trade costs.   is the vector of coefficients associated with 
R. Finally, 
ij
tu  is an unobservable shock. We further assume that fixed costs are 
)exp( ijt
ij
k
jiij
tF   , where 𝜙
𝑖 represents fixed costs specific to the export-
ing country, 𝜙𝑗 represents fixed costs specific to the importing country, 𝜙𝑖𝑗 repre-
sents country-pair-specific fixed costs, and 
ij
t  represents country-pair-specific 
random components. 
Taking logs of both sides of equation (3) and substituting expressions for the 
variable and fixed trade costs yields: 
ij
t
ijjij
t
ij
t
iji
t
ij
kt
d
Rdistw



 lnln)1(0
,   (4) 
where 
j
t
jj
t
j
t PYd ln)1(ln    is a country j time-specific dummy and 
),0(~ 22   u
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t Nu . 
We define the probability of positive trade as 


ijjij
t
ij
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w


ln
ln)1()|0Prob(X 0
ij
t
ij
t
  (5) 
Equation (5) is a probit model with unobserved non-linear country-pair heterogene-
ity and potential autocorrelation in the error term. Since we use panel data, the 
model have additional complications. First, there is high level of persistence in 
trade between country pairs. In addition, an error term may contain an autocorrela-
tion due to macroeconomic and other unobservable shocks. To account for the 
panel dimension of the data in the probit specification, we employ the methodolo-
gy outlined in Wooldridge (2005), which deals with both dynamic aspect of trade 
and with autocorrelation in the error term. The identifying assumption here is that 
the unobserved heterogeneity is random, potentially depends on initial trade sta-
tus, observable trade costs and other observable characteristics of countries i and j, 
and has a normal conditional density function. In practical terms, we estimate (5) 
adding initial state of countries trade, Tradeij,t0 and period average values for all 
time varying dependent variables. 
For better identification, several variables that affect fixed costs but that have no 
effect on the volume of trade (and thus are included in the selection equation but 
not the gravity equation) are needed. Based on the results from Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008), we control for pair-specific fixed costs by including a com-
mon religion dummy as one of the variables that affects the decision of a firm to 
trade but has no significant impact on the volume of trade. To control for the ex-
porter country-specific fixed costs, we include number of documents required to 
export from country i and number of documents required to import to country j. 
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These two variables do not vary with volume of exports per transaction and, almost 
by definition, are counted as the transaction fixed costs. 
Gravity equation 
Taking the logs of both sides of equation (1) and substituting for 
ij
tT  yields 
ln 𝑋𝑡
𝑖𝑗 = ln 𝑠𝑡
𝑖 + ln𝑌𝑡
𝑖 + ln𝑌𝑡
𝑗 − 𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑗𝛾 + ln𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑗 − 
(1 − 𝜎) ln𝑃𝑡
𝑗 − ln𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑡
𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑡
𝑖𝑗𝜋 + 𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑗
       (6) 
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is the multilateral resistance term, an integral measure of trade barriers of a coun-
try vis-à-vis all its trading partners (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), which ac-
counts for the endogenous and simultaneous determination of trade flows across 
all countries. The multilateral resistance term is not observable and according to 
theory is simultaneously determined for all countries. We control for the MRT fol-
lowing the Baier and Bergstrand (2009) procedure. 
We treat the unobserved heterogeneity semi-parametrically and use the infor-
mation acquired at the first stage of the estimation by identifying 



3
1
0 )ˆ(ˆ)0|(ln
m
mij
tm
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t
ij
t bbXuVE  , where 
ij
tˆ  is the inverse Mills ratio 
that accounts for the sample selection bias and the polynomial of degree three in 
)ˆ(ˆˆ 1 ijt
ij
t
ij
t 
  corrects for the firm-level heterogeneity. As shown by Helpman 
et al. (2008), the polynomial of degree 3 is a sufficiently flexible and accurate ap-
proximation of the underlying unknown function of the distribution of productivity 
)(aG . We estimate (6) by the Hausman-Taylor method (Hausman and Taylor, 
1981) that uses time-varying variables that are not correlated with 
ij
tu  as instru-
ments for endogenous components of Z. As a robustness check, we also present the 
results with the country-pair fixed effects included into the estimation equation. 
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Table 2 Gravity model variables: definitions  and data sources 
Variables Description Sources 
Dependent vari-
ables     
Tradeijk,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if exports of product k from i to j at time t 
are positive and zero otherwise Author's calculations 
Exportijk,t 
Export from i to j of product k at time t, in thousands of current 
$US. COMTRADE exports data of HS six and four -digit product cat-
egories in 1996-2010 
United Nations Com-
modity Trade Statistics 
Database 
Endogenous 
variables   
 
SPSjk,t Binary variable equal to 1 if country j reported a SPS measure on 
product k at time t 
WTO I-TIP database 
TBTjk,t Binary variable equal to 1 if country j reported a TBT measure on 
product k at time t 
WTO I-TIP database 
STCijk,t Binary variable equal to 1 if country i has complained against coun-
try j about SPS or TBT measure imposed on product k at time t 
WTO I-TIP database 
Independent 
variables   
  
ln(share export-
ki,t) Ln export share of product k in total export of country i at time t. 
Author's calculations 
ln(GDPi,t) Ln gross domestic product of country i at time t, in current million 
$US 
WDI (2012) 
ln(GDPj,t) Ln gross domestic product of country j at time t, in current million 
$US 
WDI (2012) 
ln(distanceij)  
Ln distance between the biggest cities of countries i and j. dkl  is the 
distance between cities k and l. 
 
CEPII 
Common bor-
derij 
Binary variable indicating whether the two countries are contigu-
ous, 1 or not 
CEPII 
Colonyij Binary variable set equal to 1 if countries i and j have had colonial 
ties 
CEPII 
Common 
languageij 
Binary variable indicating whether countries i and j share a com-
mon language (a language is spoken by at least 9% of the popula-
tion in both countries) 
CEPII 
Common legal 
originij 
Binary variable set equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common 
origin of the legal system.  The origins are British, French, German, 
Soviet 
CEPII 
ln(shipping 
costi) Ln cost of shipping a container from country i, period average 
Doing Business (2012) 
ln(shipping 
costj) Ln cost of shipping a container to country j, period average 
Doing Business (2012) 
WTOi,t Binary variable indicating whether country i is a WTO member on or 
before date t 
WTO website 
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Variables Description Sources 
WTOj,t Binary variable indicating whether country j is a WTO member on or 
before date t 
WTO website 
RTAij,t Binary variable indicating whether countries i and j signed a re-
gional trade agreement on or before date t 
WTO website 
Selection vari-
ables   
  
ln(GDP per cap-
itai,t) log GDP per capita of country i , in current thousand $US 
WDI (2012) 
Common reli-
gionij 
Binary variable set equal to 1 if countries i and j share the same 
religion. 
CEPII 
ln(doci) log Number of documents to export from country i, period average Doing Business (2012) 
ln(docj) log Number of documents to import to country j, period average Doing Business (2012) 
 
 
 Results 
Aggregate results 
Table 3 reports the results of the first (probit) and second (HT and FE) stages of es-
timating the effect of STB/TBT on exports for the samples of aggregate seafood 
trade (all product categories), raw and semi-processed seafood (HS two-digit code 
03), and processed seafood (HS four-digit codes 1603, 1604, and 1605). The de-
pendent variable in the probit model is the probability of positive export from coun-
try i to country j at time t. The dependent variable in HT and FE models is the natu-
ral logarithm of exports from country i to country j at time t. 
For the probability of trade, where the marginal effects are reported in the first 
column of Table 3, SPS measures and STCs enter the equation with mostly positive 
and significant coefficients, while TBT measures are significantly negative for the 
processed seafood sample only. The positive effect of SPS measures and STCs 
points to the endogeneity problem. SPS are more likely to be imposed by countries 
that import seafood products from more countries. STCs are more likely to be raised 
if the NTBs affect existing export flows. The positive news is that those measures do 
not create a prohibitive trade barriers on the extensive margins of seafood trade. 
Perhaps it indicates that the SPS and STC have small impact on fixed costs of ex-
porting and fixed cost of compliance are small.  TBT measures have influence sea-
food exports on the extensive margins negatively, but not significantly in two out of 
three samples. However, coefficients on TBT is negative and statistically significant 
for the processed seafood, meaning that TBT measures reduce exports on the ex-
tensive margins, perhaps by having a higher fixed costs of compliance. 
Other variables have expected signs.  Countries with larger market size are more 
likely to attract positive trade flows as indicated by the positive coefficient of 
ln(GDPj,t). Distance reduces the likelihood of positive exports. Positive exports 
show strong persistence and strongly depend on the initial conditions as indicated 
by large and significant coefficients of Tradeijh,t-1 and Tradeijh,1996. Trade facilitation 
measures of the exporting country measured by cost of shipping a container and num-
ber of documents required to export have a strong negative effect on the likelihood of 
exports, while trade facilitation measures of the importing country enter both positively 
(number of documents required to import) and negatively (cost of shipping a container 
to country j). Countries that share a common language, have common border, colonial 
ties, and common legal origin are more likely to trade seafood products. Multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements promote seafood trade on the extensive margins.  
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Table 3 Aggregate seafood trade: effect of NTBs on extensive and intensive margins 
  
All Seafood 
Raw and semi-processed seafood 
(HS 03) 
Processed seafood (HS 1603, 
1604, 1605) 
  Probit HT FE Probit HT FE Probit HT FE 
SPS 0.0057*** -0.052 -0.025 0.0028* 0.0016 0.030 0.0093*** -0.038 -0.022 
 
(0.001) (0.037) (0.026) (0.001) (0.040) (0.027) (0.001) (0.040) (0.032) 
TBT -0.0027 0.053 0.10* -0.0035 0.017 0.031 -0.0040** 0.082 0.11*** 
 
(0.003) (0.076) (0.052) (0.002) (0.072) (0.057) (0.001) (0.051) (0.030) 
STC 0.10*** -0.27* -0.12 0.080*** -0.12 0.0053 0.080*** -0.82* -0.77*** 
 
(0.008) (0.133) (0.100) (0.006) (0.130) (0.087) (0.008) (0.379) (0.230) 
ln(GDP per capitai,t) -0.0071*** 
  
-0.0046** 
  
-0.0029* 
  
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.001) 
  
Mean ln(GDP per 
capitai) 0.015***   0.012***   0.011***   
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
ln(share exportik,t) 
 
0.42*** 0.32*** 
 
0.40*** 0.32*** 
 
0.36*** 0.29*** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.013) 
 
(0.031) (0.013) 
 
(0.029) (0.012) 
ln(GDPi,t) 
 
0.38*** 0.37*** 
 
0.35*** 0.27*** 
 
0.29*** 0.63*** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.034) 
 
(0.019) (0.038) 
 
(0.029) (0.045) 
ln(GDPj,t) 0.015*** 0.58*** 0.87*** 0.014*** 0.57*** 0.88*** 0.0095*** 0.44*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.001) (0.019) (0.031) (0.001) (0.019) (0.035) (0.001) (0.023) (0.040) 
Mean ln(GDPj) -0.0026 
  
-0.0016 
  
-0.0023 
  
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
ln(distanceij) -0.015*** -0.61*** 
 
-0.013*** -0.59*** 
 
-0.011*** -0.40*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.048) 
 
(0.001) (0.056) 
 
(0.000) (0.062) 
 
Tradeij,t-1 0.23*** 
  
0.21*** 
  
0.17*** 
  
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
Tradeij,1996 0.074*** 
  
0.073*** 
  
0.051*** 
  
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
ln(shipping costi) -0.039*** -1.15*** 
 
-0.029*** -0.67*** 
 
-0.036*** -2.09*** 
 
 
(0.003) (0.191) 
 
(0.003) (0.188) 
 
(0.002) (0.254) 
 
ln(shipping costj) -0.0051* 0.38* 
 
-0.0083*** 0.097 
 
-0.0028 1.08*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.163) 
 
(0.002) (0.152) 
 
(0.002) (0.197) 
 
ln(docsi) -0.0048* 
  
0.0040 
  
-0.015*** 
  
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
ln(docsj) 0.016*** 
  
0.0055* 
  
0.020*** 
  
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
Common languageij 0.012*** 0.18* 
 
0.012*** 0.16* 
 
0.0083*** 0.22* 
 
 
(0.001) (0.073) 
 
(0.001) (0.077) 
 
(0.001) (0.095) 
 
Common borderij 0.046*** 1.11*** 
 
0.047*** 0.96*** 
 
0.023*** 1.09*** 
 
 
(0.003) (0.144) 
 
(0.002) (0.151) 
 
(0.002) (0.144) 
 
Colonial tiesij 0.042*** 0.37 
 
0.039*** 0.24 
 
0.035*** 0.34 
 
 
(0.004) (0.191) 
 
(0.003) (0.172) 
 
(0.003) (0.177) 
 
Oleksandr Shepotylo 22 
Common legal originij 0.011*** 0.36*** 
 
0.0094*** 0.27*** 
 
0.011*** 0.53*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.060) 
 
(0.001) (0.055) 
 
(0.001) (0.073) 
 
Common religionij -0.0032* 
  
-0.0062*** 
  
0.0015 
  
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.001) 
  
WTOi,t 0.011*** 0.30*** 
 
0.023*** 0.24* 
 
0.0028** 0.49*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.082) 
 
(0.001) (0.095) 
 
(0.001) (0.111) 
 
WTOj,t 0.019*** -0.017 
 
0.0081*** -0.038 
 
0.0049*** -0.021 
 
 
(0.001) (0.067) 
 
(0.001) (0.069) 
 
(0.001) (0.080) 
 
RTAij,t 0.023*** -0.16** -0.046 0.019*** -0.11 0.023 0.017*** -0.099 
 
 
(0.001) (0.058) (0.038) (0.001) (0.056) (0.042) (0.001) (0.084) 
 
Remoteness distance 
 
-0.050 
  
0.18 
  
0.45 
 
 
 
(0.833) 
  
(0.795) 
  
(0.863) 
 
Remoteness border 
 
9.99* 
  
11.7** 
  
24.0*** 
 
 
 
(4.081) 
  
(4.531) 
  
(5.099) 
 
Remoteness RTA 
 
1.47* 
  
2.06* 
  
-0.77 
 
 
 
(0.643) 
  
(0.851) 
  
(0.810) 
 
Remoteness colony 
 
-5.19 
  
-2.76 
  
3.24 
 
 
 
(4.007) 
  
(4.763) 
 
  (5.667) 
 
Remoteness legal 
 
10.1*** 
  
9.12*** 
  
5.01*** 
 
 
 
(1.147) 
  
(1.283) 
  
(1.509) 
 
Nu 
 
-0.48** -0.20 
 
-0.48* -0.20 
 
-0.15 0.080 
 
 
(0.175) (0.147) 
 
(0.188) (0.154) 
 
(0.213) (0.182) 
Z 
 
-2.69* -0.66 
 
-2.49 -0.32 
 
0.34 1.90 
 
 
(1.274) (1.084) 
 
(1.438) (1.166) 
 
(1.663) (1.469) 
z2 
 
1.89* 0.70 
 
1.77* 0.46 
 
0.039 -0.86 
 
 
(0.739) (0.632) 
 
(0.849) (0.689) 
 
(1.014) (0.892) 
z3 
 
-0.34* -0.14 
 
-0.34* -0.10 
 
0.036 0.19 
 
 
(0.140) (0.121) 
 
(0.163) (0.134) 
 
(0.208) (0.178) 
                    
Chi-squared 203148.8 71086.7 
 
185543.4 21658.5 
 
146682.0 18324.1 
 
Pseudo R2 0.57 
 
0.29 0.56 
 
0.28 0.59 
 
0.24 
Observations 378954 66918 66918 376677 58170 58170 348342 39402 39402 
For probit model marginal effects 
are reported. Standard errors in pa-
rentheses 
        * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
         
Table 3 also reports the estimates of the effect of NTBs on seafood exports at the 
intensive margins of trade, using the Hausman-Taylor specification (HT) and coun-
try-pair fixed effects (FE). The HT method is more efficient but can produce biased 
estimates if the endogenous variables are not properly instrumented. Both methods 
produce results that indicate that SPS measures and STCs have a negative effect on 
the value of trade, while TBTs have positive effect on the value of trade. This is con-
sistent with the story that SPS measures influence variable trade costs, while TBT 
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measures have larger effect on fixed exporting costs that cut off the least efficient 
counties from exporting and, hence, increase the export of the most efficient pro-
ducers. As a result, imposing a TBT sets prohibitive barriers to trade for all firms in 
some countries and narrows the set of exporters from other countries – only the 
most productive firms are able to export with non-negative profits but at larger 
quantities. It also may indicate that TBT are more frequently applied against coun-
tries that import seafood more intensively.  
WTO members export more seafood.  WTO members also import more, but it is 
mostly due to wider variety of imports from different countries, not due to larger 
value of import per exporter. RTAs do not robustly promote exports at the intensive 
margins of trade. To the contrary, value of trade is lower if countries have a bilat-
eral trade agreement. However, this result cannot be interpreted separately from 
the fact that the bilateral trade agreement has a strong positive effect on the proba-
bility of trade. RTAs reduce fixed costs of trade leading to larger variety of goods 
exported to more countries but in smaller volume.  Other variables have expected 
signs and work similarly as for extensive margins of trade. Countries that share a 
common language, have common border, colonial ties, and common legal origin are 
more likely to trade seafood products. Variables that control for selection and firm het-
erogeneity are jointly significant, indicating presence of both sources of bias and war-
ranting for their correction. 
Results at 4 digit level 
We also analyze the effect of NTBs on export of seafood at more disaggregated lev-
el, because of high potential heterogeneity of the impact of NTBs on different types 
of products (i.e. SPS applied to fresh fish vs SPS applied to frozen fish may differ in 
terms and cost of compliance). Also, there is a large variability in the scope and 
intensity of NTBs across product lines. For instance export of shrimps, which is the 
largest item of global seafood trade in terms of value, has been heavily targeted by 
SPS measure both in EU and US.  In this section we report the results of the analysis 
at HS four-digit level of aggregation. The results are broadly i agreement with the 
results for the more aggregated data, however the results differ across product lines 
quite substantially. 
Extensive margins of trade 
Table 4 reports the results of the first stage estimation of the probability of positive 
export for the HS four-digit product categories. SPS measures and STCs enter the 
equation with mostly positive and significant coefficients, while TBT measures are 
mostly insignificant. Similarly to the aggregate results, the positive effect of SPS 
measures and STCs points to the endogeneity problem. SPS are more likely to be 
imposed by countries that import seafood products from more countries. STCs are 
more likely to be raised if the NTBs affect existing export flows. TBT measures have 
influence seafood exports on the extensive margins on a smaller scale, both in 
terms of statistical significance (only three product categories out of ten) and in 
terms of economic magnitude. However, coefficients on TBT are mostly negative 
and in two cases (0305 Fish, dried, salted or in brine; smoked fish and 0306 Crus-
taceans) are statistically significant. It can be concluded that TBT measures reduce 
exports on the extensive margins, perhaps by having a higher fixed costs of com-
pliance. 
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Other variables have expected signs.  Countries with larger market size are more 
likely to attract positive trade flows as indicated by the positive coefficient of 
ln(GDPj,t). Distance reduces the likelihood of positive exports. Positive exports 
show strong persistence and strongly depend on the initial conditions as indicated 
by large and significant coefficients of Tradeijh,t-1 and Tradeijh,1996. Trade facilitation 
measures of the exporting country measured by cost of shipping a container and 
number of documents required to export have a strong negative effect on the likeli-
hood of exports for most product categories, while trade facilitation measures of 
the importing country are less robust to predict probability of export. Countries that 
share a common language, have common border, colonial ties, and common legal 
origin are more likely to trade seafood products. Multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements promote seafood trade on the extensive margins.  
Table 4 First stage results at HS four-digit level: Probit model 
HS 4-digit 0301 0302 0303 0304 0305 0306 0307 1603 1604 1605 
SPS 0.040** 0.066*** -0.020 0.054*** -0.018 0.043*** 0.040** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) 
TBT 0.012 -0.045 -0.037 -0.058 0.084** -0.11*** -0.065* -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021) 
STC 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.55*** 0.72*** 0.44*** 0.65*** 0.60*** -0.30 0.88*** 0.78*** 
 
(0.052) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.055) (0.231) (0.085) (0.099) 
ln(GDP per 
capitai,t) -0.17*** -0.073** -0.050** -0.031 -0.052* -.073*** -0.059** 0.026 -0.042* -0.0031 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.020) (0.026) 
Mean ln(GDP 
per capitai) 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.081*** 0.11*** 0.100*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 
 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.042) (0.020) (0.027) 
ln(GDPj,t) 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.11** 0.12*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.016) (0.021) 
Mean 
ln(GDPj) -0.019 -0.026 -0.053*** -0.0057 -0.020 0.011 -0.063*** 0.042 -0.036* -0.056** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.016) (0.021) 
ln(distanceij) -0.14*** -0.23*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.14*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) 
Tradeijh,t-1 2.40*** 2.04*** 2.18*** 2.27*** 2.12*** 2.17*** 2.22*** 2.22*** 2.27*** 2.30*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) 
Tradeijh,1996 0.65*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.80*** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015) (0.020) 
ln(shipping 
costi) -0.022 -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.35*** -0.54*** -0.52*** -0.59*** -0.31*** 
 
(0.047) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.069) (0.031) (0.045) 
ln(shipping 
costj) -0.47*** 0.10*** 0.13*** -0.038 -0.057 -0.012 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.050 -0.19*** 
 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.065) (0.030) (0.042) 
ln(docsi) -0.12*** 0.045 0.18*** -0.00010 -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.0031 0.15** -0.22*** -0.13*** 
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HS 4-digit 0301 0302 0303 0304 0305 0306 0307 1603 1604 1605 
 
(0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.052) (0.026) (0.034) 
ln(docsj) -0.0052 0.0000074 0.12*** -0.054 -0.022 0.081** 0.082** 0.015 0.28*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.049) (0.026) (0.034) 
Common 
languageij 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.100*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) 
Common 
borderij 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.30*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.026) (0.031) 
Colonial tiesij 0.29*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.49*** 0.42*** 
 
(0.041) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.052) (0.036) (0.037) 
Common 
legal originij 0.092*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.085*** 0.094*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) 
Common 
religionij -0.060* -0.030 -.083*** -0.046* -0.12*** 0.012 -.097*** -0.050 0.022 -.090*** 
 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.034) (0.018) (0.024) 
WTOi,t 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.26*** -0.030* 0.12*** 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.041) (0.014) (0.019) 
WTOj,t 0.10*** 0.084*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.13*** 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.18*** 0.067*** 0.018 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.012) (0.016) 
RTAij,t 0.076*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.015) (0.018) 
Chi-squared 85103.9 91188.4 125871.7 112191.8 100354.8 102793.9 100488.1 35851.6 135389.2 88946.0 
Pseudo R2 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.61 
Observations 334464 364852 357531 343633 352902 343398 331140 213118 343478 305694 
Dependent variable is an indicator whether export from country i to country j in product h at time t is positive or not. The model is estimated by 
probit, 
 taking into account the panel component as suggested by Wooldridge (2005) Standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects are included but 
not reported. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Intensive margins of trade: Hausman-Taylor results 
Table 5 presents the results of estimation of the gravity equation using the Haus-
man-Taylor method. The effect of the NTBs at the intensive margins is not as strong 
as at the extensive margins. SPS measures are negative and significant in two out of 
ten cases, while positive and significant for fish fillet and other fish meat (HS 
0304). There is a view that introduction of SPS measures may serve as a catalyst of 
trade if consumers are concerned about food quality and safety. In this case intro-
ducing an SPS measure that improves quality and safety would stimulate demand 
leading to positive association between an NTB and export. TBT measures have 
mostly positive effect on export value, indicating their relatively larger influence on 
fixed rather than variable trade costs. However, the coefficient on TBT is statistical-
ly significant only for Crustaceans (HS 0306). STCs effect on export volume is al-
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ways negative and significant for six out of ten product lines. Unlike SPS and TBT 
measures that do not vary across exporters, STC is defined at bilateral level. It is 
natural to expect that the concern is raised by exporting country that is hurt by the 
SPS measure the most. Therefore, we take it is the evidence of negative association 
between STCs and volume of trade, rather than as causal effect of NTBs on export. 
 
Table 5 Effect of NTBs on intensive margins of export for HS 4-digit products: Hausman-
Taylor estimation 
HS 4  digit code 0301 0302 0303 0304 0305 0306 0307 1603 1604 1605 
SPS -0.048 0.0028 -0.073* 0.092** -0.0027 -0.20*** -0.013 0.019 -0.026 0.059 
 
(0.035) (0.048) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.074) (0.031) (0.047) 
TBT -0.046 0.055 0.11 0.0097 0.034 0.19* -0.078 0.071 0.035 0.037 
 
(0.070) (0.103) (0.069) (0.079) (0.079) (0.088) (0.077) (0.069) (0.030) (0.042) 
STC -0.24** -0.59*** -0.16 -0.35*** -0.17 -0.41*** -0.30** -0.16 -0.60** -0.73 
 
(0.088) (0.109) (0.092) (0.100) (0.123) (0.105) (0.096) (0.508) (0.191) (0.393) 
ln(share exportik,t) 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
ln(GDPi,t) 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.20*** 0.33*** 
 
(0.032) (0.036) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.026) (0.051) (0.027) (0.038) 
ln(GDPj,t) 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.049) (0.022) (0.027) 
ln(distanceij) -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.20*** -0.35*** -0.31*** -0.45*** -0.35*** -0.19* -0.34*** -0.49*** 
 
(0.067) (0.081) (0.055) (0.059) (0.077) (0.074) (0.080) (0.083) (0.059) (0.063) 
ln(shipping costi) -0.69 -0.66* -0.50* -1.02*** 0.29 -0.35 -1.40*** -0.027 -2.09*** -1.50*** 
 
(0.413) (0.275) (0.239) (0.277) (0.297) (0.356) (0.341) (0.413) (0.269) (0.415) 
ln(shipping costj) -0.067 0.20 0.23 0.58* -0.63* -0.16 0.92** -0.23 1.05*** 0.39 
 
(0.350) (0.240) (0.190) (0.270) (0.256) (0.324) (0.315) (0.357) (0.255) (0.419) 
Common languageij 0.27* 0.13 -0.065 -0.0039 0.063 0.0061 -0.18 0.19 0.065 0.40** 
 
(0.121) (0.113) (0.077) (0.115) (0.120) (0.112) (0.125) (0.152) (0.124) (0.122) 
Common borderij 0.53* 0.77*** 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.65*** 0.17 0.58*** 0.26 1.24*** 0.40* 
 
(0.213) (0.170) (0.147) (0.140) (0.145) (0.159) (0.158) (0.294) (0.141) (0.173) 
Colonial tiesij -0.045 -0.30 -0.0045 -0.17 0.36 -0.11 -0.36 0.35 0.36 0.13 
 
(0.253) (0.208) (0.258) (0.168) (0.229) (0.241) (0.213) (0.277) (0.225) (0.217) 
Common legal originij 0.27** 0.28** 0.14* 0.022 0.091 0.38*** 0.25** 0.18 0.58*** 0.24** 
 
(0.084) (0.093) (0.066) (0.082) (0.072) (0.108) (0.095) (0.157) (0.071) (0.087) 
WTOi,t -0.25* -0.61*** 0.16 0.18 0.22 -0.11 0.18 -0.11 0.51*** 0.39* 
 
(0.110) (0.116) (0.114) (0.095) (0.163) (0.130) (0.106) (0.379) (0.119) (0.168) 
WTOj,t 0.0055 0.31* 0.067 0.15 -0.20 -0.20 -0.023 -0.32 -0.020 0.11 
 
(0.125) (0.140) (0.084) (0.085) (0.116) (0.120) (0.101) (0.292) (0.088) (0.098) 
RTAij,t -0.21 -0.043 -0.22* -0.013 0.15 -0.080 -0.22* 0.33 -0.11 0.057 
 
(0.110) (0.127) (0.091) (0.089) (0.116) (0.119) (0.112) (0.227) (0.084) (0.106) 
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HS 4  digit code 0301 0302 0303 0304 0305 0306 0307 1603 1604 1605 
Remoteness distance -3.46*** -1.51 1.31 -0.12 1.39 1.55 4.03*** 1.61 -0.060 1.08 
 
(0.998) (1.513) (0.798) (0.969) (1.106) (1.127) (0.916) (1.822) (1.050) (1.171) 
Remoteness border -14.3* -6.14 6.60 25.1*** 11.7* 19.7** 12.6* 1.08 22.4*** 30.7*** 
 
(7.196) (5.088) (4.262) (4.475) (5.779) (6.929) (6.257) (7.319) (4.843) (5.649) 
Remoteness RTA 3.42** -2.16 0.93 -0.69 -2.53* 0.75 0.46 -7.53** 0.069 -3.36** 
 
(1.176) (1.380) (1.141) (1.293) (1.216) (1.592) (1.379) (2.801) (0.993) (1.224) 
Remoteness colony 1.11 8.61 1.24 8.17 -2.46 -0.026 14.7* 4.05 6.20 -0.30 
 
(6.001) (7.905) (6.335) (8.343) (5.730) (7.925) (6.797) (12.311) (7.405) (6.612) 
Remoteness legal 0.45 6.19** 3.96* 4.80* 3.59 9.08*** 4.26* 0.33 7.14*** 1.67 
 
(2.283) (2.174) (1.547) (2.096) (1.942) (2.019) (1.954) (3.615) (1.830) (2.749) 
η 0.25 -0.83** -0.35 -0.24 -0.42 -0.097 -0.58 0.62 0.11 -0.027 
 
(0.253) (0.289) (0.251) (0.252) (0.323) (0.286) (0.304) (0.554) (0.278) (0.274) 
z 3.13 -6.69** -2.19 -0.59 -0.83 0.52 -5.06 7.25 2.54 0.30 
 
(2.348) (2.574) (2.144) (2.244) (3.048) (2.635) (2.942) (5.752) (2.312) (2.419) 
z2 -1.67 4.85** 2.06 0.75 0.24 -0.013 3.86* -4.28 -1.33 0.42 
 
(1.525) (1.660) (1.360) (1.403) (2.010) (1.733) (1.963) (3.953) (1.416) (1.533) 
z3 0.37 -0.94** -0.47 -0.12 0.13 0.069 -0.81 0.91 0.31 -0.10 
 
(0.325) (0.353) (0.286) (0.287) (0.440) (0.378) (0.432) (0.900) (0.284) (0.319) 
Chi-squared 5899.0 3783.7 9442.2 13234.6 4306.2 8739.5 5695.8 2371.6 28263.0 10593.8 
Observations 17637 21266 33678 27372 23206 25246 23820 6813 35713 19213 
Dependent variable is export from country i to country j of product k at time t. The model is estimated by Hausman-Taylor method, treating SPS, TPT, and STC 
measures as endogenous. Time fixed effects are included but not reported. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Intensive margins of trade: Fixed effect results  
Table 6 presents the results of estimation of the gravity equation using the country-
pair fixed effects. This estimation is robust to correlation of our explanatory varia-
bles with unobserved time-invariant country-pair specific characteristics that are 
not captured by other time-invariant country-pair variables such as distance, pair-
specific trade costs, etc. For instance, it takes into account political tension be-
tween countries, which are likely to be positively correlated with NTBs. The results 
are broadly in agreement with the results estimated by the Hausman-Taylor meth-
od. 
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Table 6 Effect of NTBs on intensive margins of export for HS 4-digit products: fixed effect 
estimation 
HS 4  digit code 0301 0302 0303 0304 0305 0306 0307 1603 1604 1605 
SPS -0.029 0.095 -0.049 0.10** 0.036 -0.14*** -0.049 0.063 0.0049 0.050 
 
(0.036) (0.049) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.076) (0.033) (0.049) 
TBT -0.040 0.038 0.16* 0.028 -0.0020 0.19* -0.069 0.10 0.075* 0.070 
 
(0.073) (0.111) (0.073) (0.084) (0.084) (0.094) (0.082) (0.074) (0.032) (0.044) 
STC -0.15 -0.48*** -0.064 -0.23* -0.095 -0.33** -0.15 -0.29 -0.58** -0.57 
 
(0.093) (0.119) (0.098) (0.108) (0.132) (0.114) (0.103) (0.545) (0.206) (0.427) 
ln(share exportik,t) 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.015) 
ln(GDPi,t) 0.36*** 0.18* 0.14** 0.43*** 0.34*** 0.13 0.19** 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 
 
(0.067) (0.083) (0.051) (0.057) (0.070) (0.071) (0.060) (0.125) (0.050) (0.072) 
ln(GDPj,t) 0.82*** 1.07*** 0.71*** 0.91*** 0.45*** 0.84*** 0.65*** 0.18 0.64*** 0.75*** 
 
(0.062) (0.071) (0.047) (0.055) (0.056) (0.062) (0.059) (0.123) (0.042) (0.065) 
Regional trade 
agreementij,t -0.068 -0.11 -0.13* 0.00041 0.057 -0.014 -0.15* 0.020 -0.052 -0.054 
 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.055) (0.059) (0.066) (0.073) (0.064) (0.130) (0.048) (0.070) 
η 0.54* -0.51* 0.11 -0.067 -0.0035 0.15 -0.31 0.87* 0.47* 0.037 
 
(0.236) (0.237) (0.229) (0.220) (0.235) (0.247) (0.228) (0.359) (0.201) (0.232) 
z 5.61** -3.75 1.62 0.74 2.47 2.67 -2.95 9.41** 5.23** 0.62 
 
(2.120) (2.175) (2.013) (1.918) (2.128) (2.201) (2.023) (3.472) (1.675) (2.010) 
z2 -3.21* 2.86* -0.32 -0.063 -1.83 -1.47 2.53 -5.67* -2.91** 0.23 
 
(1.357) (1.437) (1.296) (1.213) (1.388) (1.422) (1.299) (2.316) (1.035) (1.262) 
z3 0.65* -0.56 -0.012 0.0085 0.54 0.36 -0.57* 1.17* 0.60** -0.088 
 
(0.288) (0.317) (0.278) (0.254) (0.303) (0.305) (0.277) (0.510) (0.212) (0.262) 
R2 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.33 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.34 
Observations 17637 21266 33678 27372 23206 25246 23820 6813 35713 19213 
Dependent variable is export from country i to country j of product k at time t. Country-pair and time fixed effects are included, but not reported. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
          
 
 
.  
 Conclusions 
We analyze the effect of NTMs on extensive and intensive margins of seafood ex-
ports at various levels of aggregation. The main result of this study is the differen-
tial effect of SPS and TBT measures. While SPS measures largely influence the pro-
duction fixed costs and the variable trade costs, increasing extensive margins of 
export and reducing intensive margins, TBTs mostly increase fixed exporting trade 
costs, reducing exports at extensive margins and increasing exports at intensive 
margins. We also find that STCs have larger effect on exports than SPS and TBT 
notifications economically and statistically – STCs are mostly raised by exporters 
when their trade is considerably affected by regulations. Finally, there is substan-
tial heterogeneity of response of exports to NTBs across product lines for higher 
disaggregated data. This finding implies that in order to estimate an effect of the 
NTM policy change on exports, both type of NTM and market structure should be 
taken into account. 
An important issue of NTM endogeneity – political economy concerns of trade 
policy that depends on the importance of large domestic producers in defining 
trade policy in importing countries --  is not fully resolved. We leave this issue for 
further analysis. 
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Results at 6 digit 
 
1st stage Probit 
 
2nd stage Hausman-Taylor 
HS 6 digit SPS TBT STC Pseudo R2 N   SPS TBT STC Chi2 N 
30110 0.056*** -0.017 0.43*** 0.62 281574 
 
-0.020 -0.028 -0.44*** 6912.9 13746 
30191 0.11** 0.13* 0.36*** 0.53 131623 
 
-0.11 -0.051 -0.14 859.9 1818 
30192 0.043 0.033 0.52*** 0.59 80710 
 
0.029 0.20 0.14 576.9 2360 
30193 0.035 0.056 0.38*** 0.57 88698 
 
0.082 -0.47 -1.49 1688.0 1728 
30199 0.0045 0.065 0.78*** 0.51 285402 
 
0.045 0.12 0.26 3308.1 6407 
30211 0.10*** 0.11* 0.37*** 0.57 196676 
 
0.11 -0.32 -1.16* 2848.2 4021 
30212 0.11*** -0.078 0.50*** 0.64 180361 
 
-0.059 -0.088 0.37 4183.1 5863 
30219 0.057* 0.050 0.40*** 0.50 260486 
 
-0.52* 0.46 -0.61 2826.7 4156 
30221 0.16*** -0.061 0.45*** 0.60 91271 
 
0.13 -0.57 0.26 2062.3 2473 
30222 0.22*** -0.083 0.26* 0.64 77154 
 
-0.30 -0.43 0.85 1437.3 2029 
30223 0.15*** 0.037 0.18 0.63 106626 
 
-0.27 -0.40 -0.12 2182.7 2848 
30229 0.053* 0.026 0.48*** 0.59 232594 
 
0.081 0.36 -1.04* 2334.4 4642 
30231 0.14*** 0.0069 0.42*** 0.50 139910 
 
0.20 -0.26 -0.54 1529.7 1890 
30232 0.13*** 0.035 0.52*** 0.51 160712 
 
-0.12 0.99* -1.31*** 1201.0 3097 
30233 0.072 -0.0064 0.18 0.50 65181 
 
0.34 -1.18 0.79 644.8 875 
30239 0.073** 0.057 0.49*** 0.52 234665 
 
0.16 0.77*** -0.52 1962.5 4416 
30240 0.16*** 0.032 0.14 0.54 102172 
 
0.17 -0.37 0.14 620.3 1989 
30250 0.21*** -0.028 0.38*** 0.61 121917 
 
-0.29 -0.58 0.33 2664.8 3626 
30261 0.071* -0.043 0.25** 0.54 186297 
 
0.15 0.97* -0.45 785.4 2637 
30262 0.30*** -0.0029 -0.16 0.65 58295 
 
-0.50 -0.030 0.62 514.4 1414 
30263 0.28*** -0.092 0.15 0.64 49012 
 
-0.18 -0.54 0.95 558.9 1499 
30264 0.18*** -0.0075 0.27** 0.55 165571 
 
0.0011 -0.37 0.96 1984.7 3104 
30265 0.15*** -0.012 0.34*** 0.62 101654 
 
-0.53*** -0.93* -0.060 1226.5 2174 
30266 0.15*** -0.086 0.18 0.57 67857 
 
-0.33 0.12 -0.86 1555.5 1474 
30269 0.054*** -0.015 0.62*** 0.57 338840 
 
-0.19 0.16 -0.41* 9777.9 13889 
30270 0.12*** -0.012 0.34*** 0.51 177807 
 
-0.016 0.23 -0.38 727.4 3120 
30310 0.066** 0.039 0.58*** 0.48 262814 
 
0.060 0.18 -0.043 2059.2 5804 
30321 0.024 -0.039 0.011 0.54 196670 
 
-0.18 0.010 -0.40 2509.3 4236 
30322 0.044 -0.080 0.10 0.56 159668 
 
-0.29** -0.047 -1.24 6184.2 4665 
30329 -0.023 -0.024 0.47*** 0.44 255420 
 
-0.13 -0.013 -0.34 2017.6 4491 
30331 0.033 -0.18** 0.30** 0.56 96305 
 
0.0035 -0.51 0.16 2002.7 2984 
30332 0.081* 0.10 0.28** 0.49 87686 
 
-0.053 0.46 -0.32 1294.6 1634 
30333 0.088** 0.044 0.059 0.53 174528 
 
-0.0068 0.67* 0.71 1285.0 3007 
30339 0.0096 -0.061 0.61*** 0.49 257470 
 
-0.033 0.51 0.37 4584.9 5282 
30341 0.070* -0.14** 0.32*** 0.44 149507 
 
-0.13 0.079 0.28 1198.9 2242 
30342 0.044 -0.13** 0.19** 0.47 165910 
 
-0.044 0.10 -0.69 1956.4 3783 
30343 -0.019 -0.17** 0.23* 0.44 101591 
 
0.032 0.90 -0.53 1310.1 1935 
30349 0.033 -0.092* 0.37*** 0.44 242785 
 
0.20 -0.14 -0.70 2388.8 4406 
30350 0.019 0.092 0.31*** 0.54 131383 
 
-0.20* 0.16 0.23 1594.4 4278 
30360 0.081** -0.18*** 0.36*** 0.51 152105 
 
-0.060 -0.14 -0.074 1374.6 3941 
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1st stage Probit 
 
2nd stage Hausman-Taylor 
HS 6 digit SPS TBT STC Pseudo R2 N   SPS TBT STC Chi2 N 
30371 0.054* 0.083* 0.12 0.51 223926 
 
0.024 0.22 0.54* 3169.1 6267 
30372 0.0016 -0.065 0.077 0.45 59258 
 
0.33 -0.073 0.28 763.6 1196 
30373 0.022 -0.0043 0.51*** 0.47 83292 
 
-0.079 -0.30 0.97 1351.5 1421 
30374 0.029 -0.019 0.41*** 0.51 224506 
 
0.21* -0.20 0.27 4503.3 9203 
30375 0.049 -0.13** 0.34*** 0.51 175264 
 
0.10 0.77** 0.11 3383.8 3833 
30376 0.056 -0.14* 0.52*** 0.51 101052 
 
0.0079 -0.47 -0.18 679.0 2009 
30377 0.010 -0.069 0.12 0.48 113496 
 
-0.070 -0.20 0.41 1652.4 1795 
30378 0.13*** -0.052 0.54*** 0.53 159877 
 
-0.23 -0.12 0.21 3963.5 4953 
30379 -0.0069 -0.080** 0.45*** 0.54 341670 
 
0.024 0.26* -0.0085 10953.2 23105 
30380 0.074** -0.089* 0.49*** 0.53 188257 
 
-0.14 -0.22 -0.31 2073.0 5319 
30410 0.11*** -0.027 0.61*** 0.55 313235 
 
-0.064 0.19 -0.41 4700.9 12582 
30420 0.059*** -0.076** 0.65*** 0.58 312794 
 
0.12* -0.078 -0.40** 4785.0 22707 
30490 0.084*** -0.025 0.62*** 0.54 307378 
 
-0.11 -0.14 -0.30* 7052.4 13228 
30510 0.0016 0.047 0.48*** 0.45 237377 
 
-0.079 -0.14 -0.22 1009.0 3229 
30520 0.046 0.13** 0.57*** 0.50 202536 
 
0.046 0.42* 0.11 1737.7 3848 
30530 0.023 0.095* 0.21** 0.52 264072 
 
-0.14 0.25 0.20 1379.2 6134 
30541 0.011 0.093* 0.071 0.62 217817 
 
-0.11 -0.15 0.33 2858.3 9256 
30542 0.048 0.17** -0.12 0.57 124217 
 
-0.18 0.40 0.23 2372.0 2585 
30549 0.017 0.14*** 0.10 0.54 289982 
 
0.056 -0.25 -0.94** 2969.5 8590 
30551 0.0049 0.036 0.22* 0.56 177688 
 
0.039 -0.18 0.82 1137.3 3454 
30559 -0.071*** 0.073* 0.19** 0.54 306728 
 
-0.18* -0.071 0.16 1096.9 9828 
30561 0.051 0.13 0.091 0.53 121699 
 
0.081 0.15 -0.90 807.5 2064 
30562 0.066 -0.14 0.41*** 0.57 68879 
 
0.16 0.23 -0.57 658.6 2031 
30563 0.044 0.10 0.31** 0.53 102232 
 
-0.28 0.33 0.017 1539.9 1872 
30569 -0.012 0.040 0.41*** 0.50 291861 
 
0.11 -0.13 0.51 1255.9 5754 
30611 0.059** -0.091* 0.59*** 0.48 236804 
 
-0.38** -0.20 -0.71* 2553.4 4961 
30612 0.053* -0.0060 0.60*** 0.53 191745 
 
-0.10 0.13 -0.36 1591.4 4893 
30613 0.052*** -0.10*** 0.36*** 0.55 302278 
 
-0.22** 0.23 -0.29* 26011.8 18152 
30614 0.10*** -0.044 0.54*** 0.57 257810 
 
-0.027 0.33 -0.029 4126.3 8012 
30619 0.067*** -0.00050 0.43*** 0.53 253264 
 
-0.077 -0.098 -1.04* 2187.1 6291 
30621 0.040 -0.20*** 0.43*** 0.54 156232 
 
-0.16 0.13 -0.052 1386.4 3031 
30622 0.038 -0.13** 0.69*** 0.57 160793 
 
-0.19 -0.13 -0.11 1422.6 4478 
30623 0.071*** -0.050 0.44*** 0.54 275562 
 
-0.23* 0.071 -0.14 2291.4 7302 
30624 0.043 -0.13** 0.38*** 0.56 198407 
 
-0.22 0.58 0.25 4200.8 5024 
30629 0.047* 0.046 0.53*** 0.54 237087 
 
-0.20* -0.11 0.53 1236.3 5489 
30710 0.0018 -0.13* 0.59*** 0.59 200264 
 
0.17 -0.10 -0.63* 2002.6 5233 
30721 0.068* -0.096 0.54*** 0.56 136284 
 
-0.18 0.074 -1.15*** 3272.0 3630 
30729 0.036 -0.023 0.39*** 0.57 214764 
 
-0.051 -0.35* -0.48* 7400.7 7361 
30731 0.100*** -0.066 0.17 0.59 145384 
 
-0.013 0.0085 -0.97 2200.2 3549 
30739 0.062** -0.017 0.084 0.56 248642 
 
-0.016 -0.027 -0.20 5196.4 6415 
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1st stage Probit 
 
2nd stage Hausman-Taylor 
HS 6 digit SPS TBT STC Pseudo R2 N   SPS TBT STC Chi2 N 
30741 0.12*** -0.065 0.29*** 0.54 218573 
 
-0.20 -0.088 -0.19 2009.9 4785 
30749 0.081*** -0.12*** 0.33*** 0.57 278928 
 
0.095 0.045 -0.083 5775.2 13293 
30751 0.20*** -0.076 0.19 0.53 133596 
 
-0.30 1.18* -1.81 1254.6 2481 
30759 0.14*** -0.091* 0.45*** 0.55 224266 
 
0.010 -0.050 0.29 5266.4 7678 
30760 0.055* -0.012 0.53*** 0.54 173188 
 
-0.27 0.094 -0.050 1200.8 3413 
30791 0.051* -0.11* 0.57*** 0.54 216933 
 
-0.25 0.13 -0.17 2150.8 4778 
30799 -0.025 -0.054 0.62*** 0.56 284304 
 
-0.13 0.20 -0.031 9317.0 11058 
160300 0.11*** -0.028 -0.30 0.59 213118 
 
0.0061 0.075 -0.12 3726.8 6813 
160411 0.10*** 0.025 -0.093 0.57 223348 
 
-0.035 -0.10 -0.28 1994.6 7726 
160412 0.084** 0.040 -0.032 0.60 183278 
 
0.080 0.13 -1.16*** 2353.7 7039 
160413 0.0061 0.032 0.91*** 0.56 297876 
 
0.052 0.00099 -1.18* 4610.1 14089 
160414 0.16*** -0.032 0.95*** 0.53 271138 
 
0.052 0.070 -0.51 4165.9 14646 
160415 0.081*** 0.040 0.19 0.52 214196 
 
0.015 -0.075 -0.34 20680.5 8896 
160416 0.066* 0.043 0.17 0.59 167988 
 
0.086 0.12 0.48 3176.6 5497 
160419 0.073*** -0.012 0.22 0.57 271828 
 
-0.15 0.042 -0.39 5153.3 13064 
160420 0.090*** 0.0036 0.46*** 0.58 298118 
 
-0.082 0.038 -0.71 12407.3 19910 
160430 0.075** 0.021 0.24 0.61 204512 
 
-0.20* -0.019 -0.023 4974.9 8690 
160510 0.13*** 0.021 0.064 0.56 201886 
 
-0.077 -0.042 -0.41 1855.9 6440 
160520 0.13*** -0.032 0.50*** 0.58 230256 
 
0.099 0.036 -0.92 5040.3 11083 
160530 0.18*** 0.0026 -0.14 0.52 112731 
 
-0.14 0.033 -0.61 1704.2 2251 
160540 0.21*** -0.0094 0.71*** 0.55 162082 
 
-0.0065 0.33** 0.32 5466.5 4634 
160590 0.051** -0.0034 0.32* 0.60 274414   -0.059 0.043 0.041 4685.4 14171 
 
Dependent variable in the first stage model is an indicator whether export from country i to country j in product k 
at time t is positive or not. The model is estimated by probit, taking into account the panel component as suggest-
ed by Wooldridge (2005) Standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects are included but not reported. De-
pendent variable in the second stage model is export from country i to country j of product k at time t. The model is 
estimated by Hausman-Taylor method, treating SPS, TPT, and STC measures as endogenous. Time fixed effects are 
included but not reported. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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